Henry Bournes Higgins was born in 1851 in County Down, Ireland, and migrated to Victoria with his family in 1870. After settling in Melbourne, he studied at the University of Melbourne, where he completed degrees in arts and law. He was admitted to the Bar in 1876 and quickly established himself as a barrister of principle and precision. His early work in the courts was marked by a quiet intensity and a deep sense of fairness, particularly when appearing in cases involving workers and the disadvantaged.

Higgins earned a reputation as a skilled advocate in equity and constitutional law. He was not flamboyant in court but was meticulous and persuasive, with a manner that combined intellectual force with ethical conviction. He was deeply influenced by progressive ideals and used his legal practice to advance causes he believed in, including the rights of women, universal education, and the protection of labour.

Elected to the Victorian Parliament in the 1890s, Higgins became a strong supporter of Federation, although he often challenged conservative tendencies within the movement. He played a key role in the Convention debates and was a vocal critic of clauses in the Constitution that he believed did not adequately protect civil liberties. In 1901 he entered the first Commonwealth Parliament as a member of the House of Representatives.

In 1906 Higgins was appointed to the High Court of Australia. Soon after, he was also made President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, where he made his most famous contribution to Australian legal and social history. In the Harvester judgment of 1907, he introduced the principle of a fair and reasonable wage, grounding it not in market value but in the needs of a worker and his family. This decision became the cornerstone of Australian industrial relations for generations.

Higgins continued to serve on the High Court until his death in 1929. His legal philosophy was grounded in the belief that law should serve justice rather than mere formalism. His contributions as a barrister, judge, and social thinker shaped not only Australian law but the broader contours of Australian public life.